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Abstract: The paper is concerned with the mean field type differential game that describes
the behavior of the large number of similar agents governed by the unique decision maker and
influenced by disturbances. It is assumed that the decision maker wishes to bring the distribution
of agents onto the target set in the space of probabilities within the state constraints. The
solution of this problem is obtained based on the notions u- and v-stability first introduced for
the finite dimensional differential games.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In this note we examine the mean field type control system
governed by two decision makers with the opposite goals.
Such systems can be called mean field type differential
games. The consider the target problem. That means that
one player (for definiteness, the first player) wishes to
bring the system to the target set within state constraint;
whereas the second player tries to prevent this. Notice that
for the mean field type differential games the target set is
a subset of the product of the time interval and the space
of probabilities.
Previously, the target problem was studied for the case
of finite-dimensional differential games. For this type of
games under some conditions it is proved that either
first player can solve target problem within the feedback
strategies or the second player can prevent the approach
using also feedback strategies see Krasovskii and Subbotin
(1988). Notice that the most important condition neces-
sary for this result is so called Isaacs’ condition which is
satisfied for example when the dynamics of the system is
split to the sum of two dynamics governed by the first and
the second players independently.
The mean field type control system describes the coop-
erative behavior of the large number of similar agents
with mean field interaction. It was first consider in Ahmed
and Ding (2001). Nowadays, the mean field field control
system are well studied. The approach going back to
the maximum principle was considered in Andersson and
Djehiche (2011), Buckdahn et al. (2011), Carmona and
Delarue (2013); the dynamic programming for mean field
type control system was developed in Bayraktar et al.
(2018), Bensoussan et al. (2015), Laurière and Pironneau
(2014)). Case when the dynamics is given by deterministic
 This work was funded by the Russian Science Foundation (project
no. 17-11-01093).
evolution was considered in Cavagnari and Marigonda
(2015), Cavagnari et al. (2017), Pogodaev (2016).
The mean field type differential game appears naturally
when we examine the mean field type control system
under assumption that the agents are influenced by the
exogenous disturbance. They were studied in Djehiche and
Hamadène (2016), Cosso and Pham (2018), Averboukh
(2018). In Cosso and Pham (2018) the mean field type
differential game with the dynamics described by SDE
were considered in the class of nonanticipative strategies.
In Averboukh (2018) the feedback approach for the case
of deterministic evolution was studied. In that paper it is
assumed that the quality of control is described by the
payoff functional, whereas in the present paper we study
the target problem.
2. PROBLEM STATEMENT
We examine the target problem on the finite time interval
for the mean field type control system governed by two
players. It is assumed that, given the flow of probabilities
describing the distribution of agents m(t), the motion of
each agent is given by the controlled differential equation
d
dt
x(t) = f(t, x(t),m(t), u, v),
t ∈ [0, T ], x(t) ∈ Rd, u ∈ U, v ∈ V.
(1)
Here u (respectively, v) is a control of the first (respec-
tively, second) player. The sets U and V are control spaces
for the first and the second players respectively. Integrat-
ing formally (1) we get that the motion of the flow of
probabilities m(·) obeys the following equation:
d
dt
m(t) = 〈f(t, ·,m(t), u, v),∇〉m(t).
In this equation, for each t ∈ [0, T ], m(t) should be
considered as functional from C1b (Rd) to Cb(Rd).
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We assume that the first player wishes to aim the system
to the set M subject to the constrains given by the set
N . The goal of the second player is opposite. We assume
that both M and N lie in the product of [0, T ] and the set
of probabilities on phase space. Moreover, it is natural to
assume that M ⊂ N .
3. GENERAL NOTATION AND STANDING
ASSUMPTIONS
If (Ω′,Σ′) and (Ω′′,Σ′′) are measurable spaces, m is a
probability on Σ′, h : Ω′ → Ω′′ is measurable, then denote
by h#m the probability on Σ
′′ given by the following rule:
for Υ ∈ Σ′′,
(h#m)(Υ)  m(h
−1(Υ)).
Further, we restrict our attention to the Borel probabil-
ities defined on the separable metric space satisfying the
Radon property (X, ρX). Denote the set of probabilities on
(X, ρX) by P(X) the set of Borel probabilities on (X, ρX).
t is natural to endow P(X) by the topology of the narrow
convergence. It is metrizable. Further, let P2(X) denote
the set of probabilities m ∈ P(X) such that, for some




We consider on P2(X) the 2-Wasserstein metric defined










Here Π(m1,m2) the sets of probabilities onX×X with the
marginal distributions equal to m1, m2. Note that P2(X)
is a Polish space when X is Polish. Additionally, if X is
compact, then the space P(X) is also compact; the sets
P(X) and P2(X) coincide and W2 metricize the narrow
convergence and P2(X) is compact.
If (X, ρX), (Y, ρY ) are separable metric spaces satisfying
the Radon property, then denote by WM(X,Y ) the set
of weakly measurable functions from X to P(Y ). If b ∈
WM(X,Y ), then let m b be a measure on X ×Y defined
by the rule: for ϕ ∈ Cb(X × Y ),∫
X×Y







Hereinafter, we write b(x, dy) instead of b(x)(dy). If (Z, ρZ)
is also a separable metric space satisfying the Radon
property, ξ ∈ P(Y ), ζ ∈ P(Z), then denote by ξζ the
product of probabilities, i.e., ξζ is a probability on Y × Z
defined by the rule: for φ ∈ Cb(Y × Z),∫
Y×Z






Further, if b ∈ WM(X,Y ), c ∈ WM(X,Z), then denote by
bc the element of WM(X,Y × Y ) defined by
(bc)(x, d(y, z))  b(x, dy)c(x, dz).
Further, if m is a finite measure on X, then Λ(X,m, Y )
is a quotient space of WM(X,Y ) under relation given by
m-a.e. coincidence. We assume the narrow convergence on
Λ(X,m, Y ) i.e. bn → b iff m  bn → m  b in the narrow
sense. If X and Y are compact, then Λ(X,m, Y ) is also
compact.
If π ∈ P(X × Y ), then denote by π(·|x) (respectively,
π(·|y)) its disintegration with respect to marginal distri-
bution on X (respectively, Y ).
To simplify notations put C  C([0, T ],Rd). Let et stand
for the evaluation operator defined by the rule: for x(·) ∈ C,
et(x(·))  x(t).
Obviously, if χ1, χ2 ∈ P2(C), then
W2(et#χ1, et#χ2) ≤ W2(χ1, χ2). (2)
Further, let M denote the set of all continuous functions
defined on [0, T ] with values in P2(Rd).
If W is a subset of [0, T ]×P2(Rd), t ∈ [0, T ], then denote
W[t]  {m ∈ P2(Rd) : (t,m) ∈ W}.
Below, let dist stand for the distance between the point
and the set.
We assume that
• the sets U and V are compact subsets of a metric
space;
• the function f is continuous;
• the function f is bounded i.e. there exists R > 0 such
that, for any t ∈ [0, T ], x ∈ Rd, u ∈ U , v ∈ V ,
‖f(t, x, u, v)‖ ≤ R;
• the function f is Lipschitz continuous w.r.t. x and
m i.e. there exists a constant L such that, for any
t ∈ [0, T ], x′, x′′ ∈ Rd, m′,m′′ ∈ P2(Rd), u ∈ U ,
v ∈ V ,
‖f(t, x′,m′, u, v)− f(t, x′′,m′′, u, v)‖
≤ L‖x′ − x′′‖+ LW2(m′,m′′);
• there exists an even function   : R → [0,+∞)
continuous and vanishing at 0 such that
‖f(t′, x,m, u, v)− f(t′, x,m, u, v)‖ ≤  (t′ − t′′);











〈w, f(t, x,m, u, v)〉.
• the sets M and N are compact;
• there exists a compact set E ⊂ Rd such that
M ⊂ N ⊂ [0, T ]× P2(E).
4. STRATEGIES AND MOTIONS
Let U0 (respectively, V0) denote the set of measurable
functions from [0, T ] to U (respectively, V ). The elements
of the sets U0 and V0 are (usual) control of the first and
the second players respectively.
It is convenient to introduce the relaxed controls. Set
U  Λ([0, T ], λ, U), V  Λ([0, T ], λ, V ).
Hereinafter λ denotes the Lebesgue measure. An element
of U (respectively, V) is a function from [0, T ] to P(U)
(respectively, P(V )).
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P(X) and P2(X) coincide and W2 metricize the narrow
convergence and P2(X) is compact.
If (X, ρX), (Y, ρY ) are separable metric spaces satisfying
the Radon property, then denote by WM(X,Y ) the set
of weakly measurable functions from X to P(Y ). If b ∈
WM(X,Y ), then let m b be a measure on X ×Y defined
by the rule: for ϕ ∈ Cb(X × Y ),∫
X×Y







Hereinafter, we write b(x, dy) instead of b(x)(dy). If (Z, ρZ)
is also a separable metric space satisfying the Radon
property, ξ ∈ P(Y ), ζ ∈ P(Z), then denote by ξζ the
product of probabilities, i.e., ξζ is a probability on Y × Z
defined by the rule: for φ ∈ Cb(Y × Z),∫
Y×Z






Further, if b ∈ WM(X,Y ), c ∈ WM(X,Z), then denote by
bc the element of WM(X,Y × Y ) defined by
(bc)(x, d(y, z))  b(x, dy)c(x, dz).
Further, if m is a finite measure on X, then Λ(X,m, Y )
is a quotient space of WM(X,Y ) under relation given by
m-a.e. coincidence. We assume the narrow convergence on
Λ(X,m, Y ) i.e. bn → b iff m  bn → m  b in the narrow
sense. If X and Y are compact, then Λ(X,m, Y ) is also
compact.
If π ∈ P(X × Y ), then denote by π(·|x) (respectively,
π(·|y)) its disintegration with respect to marginal distri-
bution on X (respectively, Y ).
To simplify notations put C  C([0, T ],Rd). Let et stand
for the evaluation operator defined by the rule: for x(·) ∈ C,
et(x(·))  x(t).
Obviously, if χ1, χ2 ∈ P2(C), then
W2(et#χ1, et#χ2) ≤ W2(χ1, χ2). (2)
Further, let M denote the set of all continuous functions
defined on [0, T ] with values in P2(Rd).
If W is a subset of [0, T ]×P2(Rd), t ∈ [0, T ], then denote
W[t]  {m ∈ P2(Rd) : (t,m) ∈ W}.
Below, let dist stand for the distance between the point
and the set.
We assume that
• the sets U and V are compact subsets of a metric
space;
• the function f is continuous;
• the function f is bounded i.e. there exists R > 0 such
that, for any t ∈ [0, T ], x ∈ Rd, u ∈ U , v ∈ V ,
‖f(t, x, u, v)‖ ≤ R;
• the function f is Lipschitz continuous w.r.t. x and
m i.e. there exists a constant L such that, for any
t ∈ [0, T ], x′, x′′ ∈ Rd, m′,m′′ ∈ P2(Rd), u ∈ U ,
v ∈ V ,
‖f(t, x′,m′, u, v)− f(t, x′′,m′′, u, v)‖
≤ L‖x′ − x′′‖+ LW2(m′,m′′);
• there exists an even function   : R → [0,+∞)
continuous and vanishing at 0 such that
‖f(t′, x,m, u, v)− f(t′, x,m, u, v)‖ ≤  (t′ − t′′);











〈w, f(t, x,m, u, v)〉.
• the sets M and N are compact;
• there exists a compact set E ⊂ Rd such that
M ⊂ N ⊂ [0, T ]× P2(E).
4. STRATEGIES AND MOTIONS
Let U0 (respectively, V0) denote the set of measurable
functions from [0, T ] to U (respectively, V ). The elements
of the sets U0 and V0 are (usual) control of the first and
the second players respectively.
It is convenient to introduce the relaxed controls. Set
U  Λ([0, T ], λ, U), V  Λ([0, T ], λ, V ).
Hereinafter λ denotes the Lebesgue measure. An element
of U (respectively, V) is a function from [0, T ] to P(U)
(respectively, P(V )).
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Without loss of generality, one can assume that
U ⊂ U0 ⊂ U , V ⊂ V0 ⊂ V.
If s ∈ [0, T ], y ∈ Rd, m(·) ξ ∈ U , ζ ∈ V, then denote by








f(t, x,m(t), u, v)ξ(t, du)ζ(t, dv),
x(s) = y.
It is not difficult to prove the uniqueness and existence
theorem for this problem.
Further, let trajsm(·) stand for the operator which assigns
to y, ξ and ζ the motion x(·, s, y,m(·), ξ, ζ). Notice that
traj maps Rd × U × V to C.
We assume that the player can influence on each agent
and his/her strategy is a function of time and current
distribution of agents. Since the agents are similar it is
reasonable to assume that the strategy is a distribution of
controls on Rd. We will consider the case when the player
chooses the constant control on a short time interval.
Denote the set of distributions of the first player’s constant
controls by Ac and the set distributions of the second
player’s constant controls by Ac by Bc i.e.
Ac  WM(Rd, U), Bc  WM(Rd, V ).
Further, we will consider the case when the players choose
the distribution of relaxed controls. Put
A  WM(Rd,U), B  WM(Rd,V).
Notice that A (respective, B) is the set of distribution of
relaxed control of the first (respectively, second) player.
In the following the distributions of pairs of control will
play the crucial role. Set D  WM(Td,U ×V). Further, we
will consider the distributions of players’ control consistent
with the distribution of controls of the first (respectively,
second) player. Namely, if α ∈ A, then denote by D1[α] the
set of distributions of pairs of controls κ ∈ D such that, for
each x ∈ Td, marginal distribution of κ(x) on U is α(x).
Further, denote by D01[α] the set of distributions κ ∈ D1[α]
such that κ(x) is concentrated on U × V0. Analogously,
given β ∈ B, let D1[β] (respectively, D01[β]) stand for the
distribution of players’ controls κ ∈ D = WM(Td,U × V)
(respectively, κ ∈ WM(Td,U0 × V)) such that, for any
x ∈ Td, the projection of κ(x) on V is β(x).
Let t0 ∈ [0, T ], m0 ∈ P2(Rd), α ∈ A, β ∈ B. We say that
the flow of probabilities m(·) ∈ M is generated by t0, m0,
and κ ∈ D if there exists a probability χ ∈ C such that
• m(t) = et#χ;
• χ = trajt0m(·)#(m0  κ).
Below we denote the flow of probabilities generated by t0,
m0, α and β by m(·, t0,m0,κ).
One can prove the existence and uniqueness theorem for
the flow of probabilities m(·, t0,m0,κ).
Now let us introduce the feedback formalization. As it was
mentioned above we assume that the feedback strategy of
the first player is a distribution of constant controls i.e.
we say that a function u from [0, T ] × P2(Rd) to Ac is
a feedback strategy of the first player. It is reasonable to
assume that if the first player uses a feedback strategy,
then the second player can use a distribution of measurable
controls. We also assume that the first player corrects
his/her control in the finite number of time instants. Thus,
we say that the motion m1(·) is generated by the initial
time t0, initial distribution of agents m0, strategy of the
first player u and a partition of time interval ∆ = {ti}ni=0
if there exist κi, i = 1, . . . , n− 1 such that
• m(t0) = m0;
• κi ∈ D01[u[ti,m(ti)]];
• for t ∈ [ti−1, ti], i = 1, . . . , n,
m(t) = m(t, ti−1,mi−1, αi−1,κi−1).
Let X 10 (t0,m0, u,∆) stand for the set of step-by-step flows
of probabilities generated by t0, m0, u and ∆.
Below we denote by X 1(t0,m0, u) the set of limit motions
m(·) such that there exist a sequence of partitions of
time interval {∆r} and a sequence of flows of probabilities
{mr(·)} such that
• d(∆r) → 0 as r → ∞;







The first player wins at (t0,m0) is there exists a strategy u
such that for any m(·) ∈ X 1(t0,m0, u) one can find a time
instant τ satisfying
• m(τ) ∈ M [τ ]
• for any t ∈ [t0, τ ], m(t) ∈ N [t].
Below we denote the set of (t0,m0) where the first player
wins by W1∗ .
If we consider the problem of the second player, then
his/her feedback strategy is a function v from [0, T ] ×
P2(Rd) to Bc. Given an initial time t0, an initial dis-
tribution of agents m0, the second players strategy v, a
partition ∆ one can define the set of corresponding flows of
probabilities X 20 (·, t0,m0, v,∆). Further, let X 2(t0,m0, v)
denote the set of limit motions.
The second player wins at (t0,m0), if there exists a
strategy v such that for any m(·) ∈ X 2(t0,m0, v) and some
τ ∈ [t0, T ] the following conditions hold:
• either τ = T or m(τ) /∈ N [τ ];
• for any t ∈ [0, τ), m(t) /∈ M [t].
Let W2∗ denote the set of (t0,m0) at those the second
player wins.
5. STABLE SETS
The following definitions extend to the case of mean field
type differential games the notions of u- and v-stability
first introduced in Krasovskii and Subbotin (1988) for the
finite dimensional differential games.
We say that the set W ⊂ N ⊂ [0, T ]×P2(Rd) is u-stable,
if for any (t∗,m∗) ∈ W, t+ ∈ [t∗, T ], β ∈ Bc there exists
a distribution of pairs of controls κ ∈ D2[β] and a time τ
such that, for m(·) = m(·, t∗,m∗,κ),
• either m(τ) ∈ M [τ ] or τ = t+;
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• m(t) ∈ W[t] when t ∈ [t∗, τ ].
The notion of v-stability is defined slightly non-symmetric.
First, recall that, if F ⊂ [0, T ]×P2(Rd), then an open set
O(F ) containing F is called a neighborhood of F . Below
we assume that F ⊂ [0, T ]× P2(E). Thus,
sup
(t′,m′)∈∂F,(t′′,m′′)∈∂O(F )
[|t− t′′|+W2(m′,m′′)] < ∞.
We say that the set W ⊂ [0, T ] × P2(Rd) is v-stable,
if, there exist neighborhoods of M and N O(M) and
O(N) satisfying the following: W ∩ O(M) = ∅ and for
any (t∗,m∗) ∈ W, t+ ∈ [t∗, T ], α ∈ Ac one can find a
distribution of the pairs of controls κ ∈ D1[α] and a time
τ such that, for m(·) = m(·, t∗,m∗,κ),
• either m(τ) /∈ O(N)[τ ] or τ = t+;
• m(t) ∈ W[t] when t ∈ [t∗, τ ].
Without loss of generality, one can assume that u- and
v-stable sets are closed.
Theorem 1. Let W be a u-stable set. Furthermore, assume
that W[T ] ⊂ M [T ]. Then there exists a strategy u such
that, for any (t0, x0) ∈ W and any m(·) ∈ X 1(t0,m0, u),
one can find a time instant τ satisfying
• m(τ) ∈ M [τ ]
• for any t ∈ [t0, τ ], m(t) ∈ N [t].
In particular, Theorem 1 states that if W is u-stable, then
W ⊂ W1∗ .
The key idea of the proof of Theorem 1 is an extension
of Krasovskii-Subbotin extremal shift rule Krasovskii and
Subbotin (1988) to the case of mean field type differential
games.
We construct the strategy u in the following way. First,
given s ∈ [0, T ], m∗ ∈ P2(Rd), x, y ∈ Rd, put




〈x− y, f(s, x,m∗, u, v)〉.
Analogously, set




〈x− y, f(s, x,m∗, u, v)〉.
Without loss of generality, one can assume that the func-
tions (x, y) → û(s, x, y,m∗) and (x, y) → v̂(s, x, y,m∗) are
measurable.
Now, let s ∈ [0, T ], m∗ ∈ P2(Rd). If (s,m∗) ∈ W, then we
put u(s,m∗) to be equal to an arbitrary distribution of the
first player’s controls α ∈ Ac.
If (s,m∗) /∈ W, then let ν∗ ∈ P2(Rd) be such that
• ν∗ ∈ W(s);
• W2(m∗, ν∗) = min{W2(m∗,m) : m ∈ W[s]}.
Further, pick π ∈ Π(m∗, ν∗) to be an optimal plan between
m∗ and ν∗. Let π(·|x) be an disintegration of π along m∗









Now set, for (s,m∗) /∈ W
u[s,m∗](x)  û(s,m∗, x, ·)#π(·|x).
The proof of optimality of the strategy u is based on the
following lemmas.
Lemma 2. Let s ∈ [0, T ], x∗, y∗ ∈ Rd, m(·), ν(·) ∈
M, ξ ∈ U , ζ ∈ V, u∗ = û(s,m(s), x∗, y∗), v∗ =
v̂(s,m(s), x∗, y∗). Denote x(·) = x(s, x∗,m(·), u∗, ζ),
x(·) = x(s, y∗, ν(·), ξ, v∗). Then, for any r ∈ [s, T ],
‖x(r)− y(r)‖2
≤ ‖x∗ − y∗‖2(1 + 3L(r − s))
+ LW2(m(s), µ(s)) + ω1(r − s) · (r − s).
Here ω1 : R → [0,+∞) is a continuous at 0, vanishing at
0 determined only by the function f .
The proof of this Lemma is analogous to the proof of
Lemma 1 in Averboukh (2018).
Integrating the result of the Lemma w.r.t. the optimal plan
π we get the following.
Lemma 3. Let s, r ∈ [0, T ], s ≤ r, m∗, ν∗ ∈ P2(Td),
π be an optimal plan between m∗ and ν∗, π(·|x),
π(·|y) be its disintegration with respect to m∗ and
ν∗ respectively, α
∗(x)  û(s,m∗, x, ·)#π(·|x), β∗(y) 
v̂(s,m∗, ·, y)#π(·|y), κ ∈ D1[α∗], ϑ ∈ D2[β∗], m(·) =
m(·, s,m∗,κ), ν(·) = m(·, s, ν∗, ϑ). Then
W2(m(r), ν(r)) ≤ W2(m∗, ν∗)(1 + 4L(r − s))
+1(r − s) · (r − s).
The proof of this lemma is the same as the proof of
Lemma 2 in Averboukh (2018).
Proof of Theorem 1. Let t0 ∈ [0, T ], m0 ∈ P2(Rd)
satisfy (t0,m0) ∈ W. We shall prove that for any ε > 0
one can find δ > 0 such that whatever ∆ = {ti}ni=0 and
m(·) ∈ X 10 (t0,m0, u,∆) are chosen there exists τ ∈ [t0, T ]
the following properties hold true:
• dist(m(τ),M [τ ]) ≤ ε;
• dist(m(t),W[t]) ≤ ε when t ∈ [t0, τ ].
Notice that there exist {κi}n−1i=0 such that κi ∈
D01[u[ti−1,m(ti−1)]] and, for t ∈ [ti−1, ti]
m(t) = m(t, ti,m(ti−1),κi−1).
Let j be the greatest number i = 1, n such that m(ti) /∈
W[ti]. Recall that W ⊂ [0, T ] × P2(E), where E is a
compact in Rd. Since m(tj−1) ∈ W[tj−1] using the u-
stability of W we get that
dist(m(tj),W[tj ]) ≤ 2R(tj − tj−1) ≤ 2Rd(∆). (3)
Now, using the u-stability of W, inclusion W[T ] ⊂ M [T ],
and Lemma 3, we construct the number l ∈ {j, . . . , n−1},
time θ ∈ [tl, tl+1], and {νi(·)}li=j such that, for τi  ti ∧ θ,
• νi(t) ∈ W(t) when t ∈ [τi, τi+1];
• νl(τ) ∈ M(τ);
• the following inequality holds true: for t ∈ [τi, τi+1],
W2(νi(t),m(t))
≤ W2(νi(τi),m(τi))(1 + 4L(t− τi))
+1(t− τi) · (t− τi).
(4)
Since dist(m(t),W[t]) ≤ W2(νi(t),m(t), applying (4) se-
quentially, and taking into account (3) we get
dist(m(t),W[t]) ≤ 2Rd(∆) exp(4L(t− tj))
+1(d(∆)) exp(4L(t− tj)) · (t− tj).
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• m(t) ∈ W[t] when t ∈ [t∗, τ ].
The notion of v-stability is defined slightly non-symmetric.
First, recall that, if F ⊂ [0, T ]×P2(Rd), then an open set
O(F ) containing F is called a neighborhood of F . Below
we assume that F ⊂ [0, T ]× P2(E). Thus,
sup
(t′,m′)∈∂F,(t′′,m′′)∈∂O(F )
[|t− t′′|+W2(m′,m′′)] < ∞.
We say that the set W ⊂ [0, T ] × P2(Rd) is v-stable,
if, there exist neighborhoods of M and N O(M) and
O(N) satisfying the following: W ∩ O(M) = ∅ and for
any (t∗,m∗) ∈ W, t+ ∈ [t∗, T ], α ∈ Ac one can find a
distribution of the pairs of controls κ ∈ D1[α] and a time
τ such that, for m(·) = m(·, t∗,m∗,κ),
• either m(τ) /∈ O(N)[τ ] or τ = t+;
• m(t) ∈ W[t] when t ∈ [t∗, τ ].
Without loss of generality, one can assume that u- and
v-stable sets are closed.
Theorem 1. Let W be a u-stable set. Furthermore, assume
that W[T ] ⊂ M [T ]. Then there exists a strategy u such
that, for any (t0, x0) ∈ W and any m(·) ∈ X 1(t0,m0, u),
one can find a time instant τ satisfying
• m(τ) ∈ M [τ ]
• for any t ∈ [t0, τ ], m(t) ∈ N [t].
In particular, Theorem 1 states that if W is u-stable, then
W ⊂ W1∗ .
The key idea of the proof of Theorem 1 is an extension
of Krasovskii-Subbotin extremal shift rule Krasovskii and
Subbotin (1988) to the case of mean field type differential
games.
We construct the strategy u in the following way. First,
given s ∈ [0, T ], m∗ ∈ P2(Rd), x, y ∈ Rd, put




〈x− y, f(s, x,m∗, u, v)〉.
Analogously, set




〈x− y, f(s, x,m∗, u, v)〉.
Without loss of generality, one can assume that the func-
tions (x, y) → û(s, x, y,m∗) and (x, y) → v̂(s, x, y,m∗) are
measurable.
Now, let s ∈ [0, T ], m∗ ∈ P2(Rd). If (s,m∗) ∈ W, then we
put u(s,m∗) to be equal to an arbitrary distribution of the
first player’s controls α ∈ Ac.
If (s,m∗) /∈ W, then let ν∗ ∈ P2(Rd) be such that
• ν∗ ∈ W(s);
• W2(m∗, ν∗) = min{W2(m∗,m) : m ∈ W[s]}.
Further, pick π ∈ Π(m∗, ν∗) to be an optimal plan between
m∗ and ν∗. Let π(·|x) be an disintegration of π along m∗









Now set, for (s,m∗) /∈ W
u[s,m∗](x)  û(s,m∗, x, ·)#π(·|x).
The proof of optimality of the strategy u is based on the
following lemmas.
Lemma 2. Let s ∈ [0, T ], x∗, y∗ ∈ Rd, m(·), ν(·) ∈
M, ξ ∈ U , ζ ∈ V, u∗ = û(s,m(s), x∗, y∗), v∗ =
v̂(s,m(s), x∗, y∗). Denote x(·) = x(s, x∗,m(·), u∗, ζ),
x(·) = x(s, y∗, ν(·), ξ, v∗). Then, for any r ∈ [s, T ],
‖x(r)− y(r)‖2
≤ ‖x∗ − y∗‖2(1 + 3L(r − s))
+ LW2(m(s), µ(s)) + ω1(r − s) · (r − s).
Here ω1 : R → [0,+∞) is a continuous at 0, vanishing at
0 determined only by the function f .
The proof of this Lemma is analogous to the proof of
Lemma 1 in Averboukh (2018).
Integrating the result of the Lemma w.r.t. the optimal plan
π we get the following.
Lemma 3. Let s, r ∈ [0, T ], s ≤ r, m∗, ν∗ ∈ P2(Td),
π be an optimal plan between m∗ and ν∗, π(·|x),
π(·|y) be its disintegration with respect to m∗ and
ν∗ respectively, α
∗(x)  û(s,m∗, x, ·)#π(·|x), β∗(y) 
v̂(s,m∗, ·, y)#π(·|y), κ ∈ D1[α∗], ϑ ∈ D2[β∗], m(·) =
m(·, s,m∗,κ), ν(·) = m(·, s, ν∗, ϑ). Then
W2(m(r), ν(r)) ≤ W2(m∗, ν∗)(1 + 4L(r − s))
+1(r − s) · (r − s).
The proof of this lemma is the same as the proof of
Lemma 2 in Averboukh (2018).
Proof of Theorem 1. Let t0 ∈ [0, T ], m0 ∈ P2(Rd)
satisfy (t0,m0) ∈ W. We shall prove that for any ε > 0
one can find δ > 0 such that whatever ∆ = {ti}ni=0 and
m(·) ∈ X 10 (t0,m0, u,∆) are chosen there exists τ ∈ [t0, T ]
the following properties hold true:
• dist(m(τ),M [τ ]) ≤ ε;
• dist(m(t),W[t]) ≤ ε when t ∈ [t0, τ ].
Notice that there exist {κi}n−1i=0 such that κi ∈
D01[u[ti−1,m(ti−1)]] and, for t ∈ [ti−1, ti]
m(t) = m(t, ti,m(ti−1),κi−1).
Let j be the greatest number i = 1, n such that m(ti) /∈
W[ti]. Recall that W ⊂ [0, T ] × P2(E), where E is a
compact in Rd. Since m(tj−1) ∈ W[tj−1] using the u-
stability of W we get that
dist(m(tj),W[tj ]) ≤ 2R(tj − tj−1) ≤ 2Rd(∆). (3)
Now, using the u-stability of W, inclusion W[T ] ⊂ M [T ],
and Lemma 3, we construct the number l ∈ {j, . . . , n−1},
time θ ∈ [tl, tl+1], and {νi(·)}li=j such that, for τi  ti ∧ θ,
• νi(t) ∈ W(t) when t ∈ [τi, τi+1];
• νl(τ) ∈ M(τ);
• the following inequality holds true: for t ∈ [τi, τi+1],
W2(νi(t),m(t))
≤ W2(νi(τi),m(τi))(1 + 4L(t− τi))
+1(t− τi) · (t− τi).
(4)
Since dist(m(t),W[t]) ≤ W2(νi(t),m(t), applying (4) se-
quentially, and taking into account (3) we get
dist(m(t),W[t]) ≤ 2Rd(∆) exp(4L(t− tj))
+1(d(∆)) exp(4L(t− tj)) · (t− tj).
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The inclusion W[t] ⊂ N [t] implies the following inequality,
for any t ∈ [t0, θ],
dist(m(t),N [t]) ≤ 2Rd(∆) exp(4L(t− tj))
+1(d(∆)) exp(4L(t− tj)) · (t− tj).
(5)
Furthermore, using the inclusion νl(θ) ∈ M [θ], we con-
clude that
dist(m(θ),M [θ]) ≤ 2Rd(∆) exp(4L(t− tj))
+1(d(∆)) exp(4L(t− tj)) · (t− tj).
(6)
Choosing δ such that
2Rδ exp(4LT ) +1(δ) exp(4LT ) · T ≤ ε,
and by (5), (6) we obtain the conclusion of the Theo-
rem. 
Theorem 4. Let W be a v-stable set. Then there exist
a neighborhoods of M and N O(M) and O(N) and a
strategy of the second player u such that, for any (t0, x0) ∈
W and anym(·) ∈ X 2(t0,m0, v) one can find a time instant
τ satisfying
• either m(τ) /∈ O(N)[τ ] or τ = T ;
• for any t ∈ [t0, τ ], m(t) /∈ O(M)[t].
The proof of Theorem 4 is analogous to the proof of
Theorem 1.
The Theorems 1 and 4 and the definitions of u- and v-
stablity as well as definitions of the set W1∗ and W2∗ implies
the following.
Theorem 5. [0, T ]×P2(Rd) = W 1∗ ∪W2∗ . The sets W1∗ , W2∗
are u- and v-stable respectively.
6. CONCLUSION
The paper was consider the mean field type differential
game. This problem arises quite naturally when we ex-
amine the system of many interacting agents pursuing
the common goal under some disturbances. In the paper
we study the target problem for the mean field type
differential game. Our results are based on Krasovskii-
Subbotin approach. In the framework of this approach
feedback strategies are used. The nonanticipative strate-
gies for mean field type differential game was developed
in Cosso and Pham (2018). In that paper it is assumed
that the players wish to minimize/maximize a functional.
The proof of equivalence between feedback formalization
and the approach based on nonanticipative strategies is
the subject of future work.
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